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This paper examines the relationship between self-control, ﬁnancial literacy and over-
indebtedness on consumer credit debt among UK consumers. Lack of self-control and ﬁnan-
cial illiteracy are positively associated with non-payment of consumer credit and self-
reported excessive ﬁnancial burdens of debt. Consumers who exhibit self-control problems
are shown tomake greater use of quick-access but high cost credit items such as store cards
and payday loans. We also ﬁnd consumers with self-control problems aremore likely to suf-
fer income shocks, credit withdrawals and unforeseen expenses on durables, suggesting that
lack of self-control increases exposure to a variety of risks. In most speciﬁcations we ﬁnd a
stronger role for lack of self-control than for ﬁnancial illiteracy in explaining consumer
over-indebtedness. We discuss the policy implications of these ﬁndings.
 2011 Elsevier B.V. Open access under CC BY license.1. IntroductionRecent research in the ﬁeld of consumer ﬁnance has focused on understanding the role of biases in consumer decisionmak-
ing andbehaviour in explainingparticipation andperformance inﬁnancialmarkets.One strandof this literature focuses on con-
sumer understanding of ﬁnancial concepts and ability to correctly interpret ﬁnancial data, commonly referred to as ‘ﬁnancial
literacy’. Empirical studies show limited participation in the stock market and limited ﬁnancial preparation for retirement are
associatedwith lower levels of ﬁnancial literacy (Banks, O’Dea, & Oldﬁeld, 2010; Bernheim, 1995, 1998; Clark,Melinda,Morrill,
& Allen, 2011; Guiso & Jappelli, 2009; Hastings, Mitchell, & Chyn, 2011; Lusardi & Mitchell, 2007; McHugh, Ranyard, & Lewis,
2011; VanRooji, Lusardi, & Alessie, 2011a; VanRooji, Lusardi, & Alessie, 2011b; Yoong, 2011).More generally, levels of ﬁnancial
literacy across populations appear low (Hoelzl & Kapetyn, 2011; Jappelli, 2010; Lusardi, 2008; Lusardi & Mitchell, 2008).
A separate strand focuses on behavioural biases such as high levels of impatience or lack of self-control. Theory has charac-
terised self-control as an intrapersonal decision time-inconsistencyproblem, a conﬂict between ‘multiple selves’ or as cue-trig-
gered mistakes, among others. (Benhabib & Bisin, 2005; Bernheim & Rangel, 2004; Kim, 2006; Strotz, 1955; Thaler & Shefrin,
1981). Empirical studies on measuring self-control problems among individuals have found a negative relationship between
measured self-control and the accumulation of wealth (Ameriks, Caplin, & Leahy, 2003; Ameriks, Caplin, Leahy, & Tyler, 2007).
Theconceptsofﬁnancial literacyandself-controlwouldalso seemveryrelevant for consumeruseof consumercreditand,more
particularly, consumer over-indebtedness. Studies in the theoretical literature have commonly cited self-control problems as a.uk
BY license.
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of self-control in consumer creditmarkets show thatmany features of consumer credit contracts are at least consistentwith time
inconsistent preferences on the part of consumers (Heidhues & Koszegi, 2010; Laibson, Repetto, & Tobacman, in press).
In this paper we empirically examine how ﬁnancial literacy and self-control relate to consumer over-indebtedness. Exist-
ing studies have shown that these concepts are relevant for understanding consumer credit use. There is evidence that con-
sumers over borrow on consumer credit products which incorporate ‘teaser rates’, a pattern in behaviour consistent with
time inconsistent choices (Ausubel, 1999; Shu & Ausubel, 2004). Also, a recent paper by Meier and Sprenger (2010) ﬁnd a
positive relationship between high levels of impatience and credit card use. Lusardi and Tufano (2009) show that low levels
of ﬁnancial literacy among consumer credit users is associated with use of high cost credit.
In contrast to previous studies we focus on over-indebtedness. This is a particularly apposite topic on which to bring to
bear the concepts of ﬁnancial literacy and self-control. Consumer credit is characterised by being readily available, high cost
compared with alternative borrowing options and potentially accruing arrears quickly. The costs of sub-optimal market par-
ticipation are potentially very high including bankruptcy and exclusion from the credit market. Rational participation in con-
sumer credit markets requires consumer understanding of ﬁnancial concepts such as annualised percentage rates,1 interest
compounding and contractual payment obligations. Prudent use of consumer credit – so called because of its associated with
the purchase of consumption goods – further requires self-control and ﬁnancial organisation. The natural implication of lacking
either of these is a higher chance of running into debt problems.
We use household survey data drawing on detailed data on consumer credit market participation, portfolios and payment
problems for a representative sample of UK consumers.2 We relate these data to survey questions which measure ﬁnancial
literacy and self-control.3 The UK is a particularly interesting context for our study: it has the second largest level of non-mort-
gage household debt (hereafter labelled ‘consumer debt’) in the world, after the United States, valued at the end of 2010 at close
to £200bn. Moreover, outstanding consumer debt as a proportion of household income has increased consistently since the mid-
1990s. The UK consumer credit market is one of the least regulated in the world, and has seen the advent of new forms of sub-
prime credit, such as store card credit, payday lending, home credit and ‘instant access instalment credit’.
We make the following new contributions. Firstly, we ﬁnd that over-indebtedness, measured both as delinquency on
repayments and self-reported ﬁnancial distress, occurs disproportionately among individuals who report self-control prob-
lems, approximately 10% of our sample. We also ﬁnd a positive relationship between ﬁnancial illiteracy and over-indebted-
ness. Multivariate estimates show a stronger role for self-control problems. In contrast, simply heavily discounting the future
or reporting being confused about ﬁnancial products are both statistically insigniﬁcant in our estimates.
Secondly, we show that individuals with self-control problems make disproportionate use of quick-access credit products
which facilitate impulse-driven purchases. As we have detailed data on consumer credit portfolios we are able to examine
the impact of ﬁnancial literacy and self-control on the use of credit product types. We show that self-control problems are
associated with greater use of in-store credit cards, mail order catalogues, home credit and pay day loans. These forms of
credit allow quick access to funds at or close to a point of purchase and so can be used to facilitate impulsive spending.
The policy implication is that individuals who exhibit such problems might beneﬁt from restricted access to such products.
Thirdly, we condition ourmodels on recent ﬁnancial shocks experienced by the household.We have individual household level
data on recent unexpected ﬁnancial changes, such as job loss and falls in income, credit withdrawals and unanticipated expenses.
Whenwe control for these events, we ﬁnd that the coefﬁcients on both our self-control and ﬁnancial literacy variables diminish in
their magnitude and statistical signiﬁcance. This implies that individuals with self-control problems and poor ﬁnancial literacy are
alsomore likely to suffer adverseﬁnancial shocks and suggests that self-control problemsmight permeate other dimensions of eco-
nomic choice which pertain to over-indebtedness, apart from consumption/saving/borrowing decisions.
Our results contribute to the empirical literature on consumer ﬁnance by demonstrating that behavioural characteristics of
consumers have non-negligible impacts on use and mis-use of consumer credit, choice of credit products, but also correlate
with income/expenditure shocks. These results contribute to the understanding of consumer behaviour in consumer credit
markets (Agarwal, Chomsisengphet, Liu, & Souleles, 2006; Agarwal, Gabaix, Driscoll, & Laibson, 2009; Campbell, 2006; Gabaix
& Laibson, 2006; Hoezl et al., 2011; Jappelli & Padula, in press; Kapetyn & Teppa, 2011; Lusardi & Tufano, 2009; Stango &
Zinman, 2009, 2011; Tufano, 2009;Vissing-Jorgensen, 2011) aswell as providing further insight into thedrivers of over-indebt-
edness in the UK context (Bridges & Disney, 2004; Bridges, Disney, & Gathergood 2008.)1 Under the UK Consumer Credit Act, lenders must display the APR at least as prominently as any other rate of charge on loan advertisements. Similar
provisions exist in the US under the Truth in Lending Act.
2 We use self-reported data on delinquency and non-payment on consumer credit products. Studies based on household data using North American samples
(the SCF, in Zinman, 2009) and South African samples (Karlan & Zinman, 2008) suggest consumers typically under-report their level of debt. However, we ﬁnd
in our sample that there does not appear to be an under-reporting problem with consumer credit delinquency. The 3-month delinquency rate on a broad range
of consumer credit products self-reported by individuals in our sample corresponds closely with industry estimates.
3 The rationale for the latter is that the concept of self-control, integrated into by various means into the theoretical self-control frameworks in the literature
(In particular, the models of Strotz (1955). Thaler and Shefrin (1981), Laibson (1997), Gulf and Pesendorfer (2001), Bernheim and Rangel (2004), Fudenberg and
Levine (2006) and Benhabib and Bisin (2005), readily translates into a core concept – impulsiveness – which can be elucidated in what has been described as
‘natural language’ (Ameriks et al., 2007) and so is appropriate for elicitation via direct survey questions. We choose this approach over asking participants in our
survey to undertake a choice task due to the inherent difﬁculties in eliciting reliable measures of time preference in experimental choice settings arising from
the impact of extra-experimental borrowing and lending opportunities, on which see Coller and Williams (1999), Harrison, Lau, and Williams (2002), Harrison,
Rutstrom, and Williams (2005), Cubitt and Read (2007).
Table 1
Demographic and economic characteristics of survey respondents.
Whole sample Analysis sample
(n) (%) (n) (%)
Sample size 3041 100 1234 100
Age
18–25 275 9.0 110 8.9
26–35 588 19.3 332 26.9
36–45 565 18.6 262 21.2
46–55 534 17.6 239 19.4
Over 55 1079 35.5 291 23.6
Gender
Female 1507 49.6 669 54.2
Male 1534 50.4 565 45.8
Marital status
Married 1980 65.1 385 68.8
Unmarried/divorced 1061 34.9 849 31.2
Education leaving age
16 or under 988 32.5 383 31.0
17–19 770 25.3 312 25.3
Over 20 1283 42.2 539 43.7
Employment status
Employed or self-employed 1729 56.7 814 66.0
Unemployed 132 4.3 53 4.3
Retired 602 19.8 124 10.0
Out of the labour force 578 19.0 243 19.7
Spouse employed 1250 41.1 614 50.2
Spouse not employed 1791 58.9 620 49.8
Dependent children
Has dependent children 578 19.0 915 74.2
No dependent children 2463 81.0 319 25.8
Homeownership status
Homeowner without mortgage 862 28.4 185 14.9
Homeowner with mortgage 1093 35.9 548 44.4
Private renter 507 16.7 265 21.5
Social renter 270 8.9 136 11.0
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To implement the survey we partnered with the market research company YouGov, integrating our survey questions into
their consumer-credit focused DebtTrack survey. The DebtTrack survey is a quarterly repeated cross-section survey of a rep-
resentative sample of UK households covering approximately 3000 households which is conducted via the internet.4 For a
fee, researchers can add questions to the core survey question modules, and we exploit this provision for our research design.
In this section we ﬁrst describe the survey and provide summary statistics, then introduce our survey questions on self-control
and other behavioural traits, and then describe our ﬁnancial literacy questions.
2.1. Survey and sample characteristics
The core survey comprises 85 questions covering household demographics, labour market information, income and bal-
ance sheet details. The consumer credit data is particularly detailed: respondents are asked to provide details about the
number and type of consumer credit products they hold (selecting product types from an exhaustive drop-down menu of
types), outstanding balances for each item (excluding transactions balances on, for example, credit cards), monthly pay-
ments, whether they are 1 month in arrears on the product, whether they are 3 months in arrears on the product, and
the value of arrears. The monthly payment question refers to the regular monthly payment or, in the case of credit products
without a regular monthly payment (such as credit cards), the payment made in the last month.
Summary statistics for the survey sample are provided in Table 1. The whole sample is comprised of 3041 households.5
For our analysis we use only households with a positive balance on at least one consumer credit item and this provides a sample4 We incorporated our questions into the September 2010 wave of the internet survey. There is evidence to suggest that internet-based surveys generate less
bias in responses compared with using telephone surveys (Chang & Krosnick, 2008).
5 Household characteristics in the whole sample match closely those in other household surveys which contain information on household credit and debt,
including ﬁnancial characteristics. Further details on data quality, which we judge to be high, are available in an earlier paper (Disney & Gathergood, 2011).
Table 2
Financial characteristics of survey respondents.
n with positive value % with positive value £ average among those with positive value
Household ﬁnances
Income 1234 100 £38,000
Liquid savings 618 50.0 £9500
Unsecured debt 1234 100 £7400
House value 695 46.3 £202,000
Mortgage debt 391 31.7 £76,000
Consumer credit holdings
Credit card 912 73.9 £4400
Overdraft 695 56.3 £1200
Personal loan 328 26.6 £6700
Store card 224 18.1 £900
Car loan 214 17.3 £5200
Mail order catalogue 221 17.9 £500
Hire purchase 90 7.3 £3500
Home credit 20 1.6 £900
Pay day loan 19 1.5 £500
Credit union 18 1.5 £2900
Over-indebtedness indicators
One-month behind 216 17.5
Three-months behind 124 10.0
Self-reported over-indebted 102 8.3
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younger, more likely to be employed and are more likely to have families. Financial characteristics of the analysis sample are
shown in Table 2. Mean total unsecured debt is £7400. Data on consumer credit holdings show that the majority of households
hold at least one credit card and have access to at least one bank overdraft. Approximately one quarter of the analysis sample
have at least one personal loan. Around one-ﬁfth hold a store card, with slightly lower proportions for car loans and mail order
catalogues.
2.2. Measures of over-indebtedness
We next turn to our measures of over-indebtedness. We choose to focus on indicators of over-indebtedness which mea-
sure delinquency on debt.6 Indicators of delinquency based measures of over-indebtedness among respondents are provided in
Table 3. Three measures of over-indebtedness are presented: 1 month delinquency on at least one credit item, 3 month delin-
quency on at least one credit item and a measure of self-reported over—indebtedness based on delinquency coupled with self-
reports of ‘real ﬁnancial problems’.7 Using this approach we are able to exploit both an objective measure (delinquency) and a
subjective measure (‘real ﬁnancial problems’). In our sample, 17.5% of households (216 observations) report being at least 1-
month delinquent on at least one credit product, 10% of households (124 observations) report being at least 3-months delin-
quent on at least one credit product. The 10% ﬁgure for 3-month delinquency closely matches industry statistics on delinquency
rates for consumer credit.8
The self-reported measure of over-indebtedness is constructed from the following question, asked of all respondents in
our analysis sample9:6 While over-indebtedness can undoubtedly occur without delinquency – individuals might have too much debt relative to their optimal level of borrowing
but nevertheless ﬁnd themselves able and willing to service the cost of their debt and maintain their contractual payments – forming measures of over-
indebtedness based on debt burdens alone is problematic. For example, high debt-to-income ratios might be taken as indicative of over-indebtedness. However,
households expecting high future income growth might optimally hold high levels of debt relative to their income. Indeed, ‘ofﬁcial’ measures of over-
indebtedness based on debt multiples, number of credit items held or income gearing can be potentially misleading by overstating levels of over-indebtedness.
Bridges et al. (2008) show that by ofﬁcial UK measures of ‘over-indebtedness’ based on such criteria, over 30% of U.K. mortgage holders and 50% of UK
unsecured credit holders would be considered to be over-indebted.
7 ‘Delinquency’ in our data refers to a missed minimum payment on a credit/store card, or a missed contractual payment on a repayment loan. So our
delinquency measure does not take into account any payment behaviour on bank overdrafts (unless the household has a repayment schedule agreed with their
bank to resolve the overdraft debt).
8 There are no ofﬁcial published statistics on consumer credit delinquency rates in the UK. The Bank of England publishes data on outstanding consumer
credit and credit written-off. The Finance and Leasing Association, the industry body for the consumer credit industry, does not publish data on the loan books
of its members. However, Moody’s rating agency does provide data on 3-month consumer credit delinquency rates among UK lenders as part of its ‘Consumer
Credit Index’. In September 2009 (the month of our survey) Moody’s reported an average 3-month consumer credit delinquency rate for the UK of 9.7%.
9 This question, together with the questions on behavioural traits were asked early-on in the survey module following the introductory section on
demographics/characteristics and prior to the section on home ownership status and mortgage/rent details. This question was asked after the questions on
behavioural traits.
Table 3














‘I am impulsive and tend to buy things even when I can’t
really afford them’
14 100 161 340 596 23
(1.1) (8.1) (13.1) (27.6) (48.3) (1.9)
Heavy discounter
‘I am prepared to spend now and let the future take care
of itself’
19 147 206 382 460 20
(1.5) (11.9) (16.7) (31.0) (37.3) (1.6)
Confused by ﬁnance
‘Financial services are complicated and confusing to me’ 111 383 335 274 109 22
(9.0) (31.0) (27.2) (22.2) (8.8) (1.8)
Table 4
Financial literacy question responses.
Simple interest question
‘‘Cheryl owes £1000 on her bank overdraft and the interest rate she is charged is 15% per year. If she didn’t pay anything off, at this interest rate, how






Do not know 72 5.8
Interest compounding question
‘‘Sarah owes £1000 on her credit card and the interest rate she is charged is 20% per year compounded annually. If she didn’t pay anything off, at this
interest rate, how many years would it take for the amount she owes to double?’’
(n) (%)
Less than 5 years 663 53.7
Between 5 and 10 years 359 29.1
More than 10 years 69 5.6
Do not know 143 11.6
Monthly payments question
‘‘David has a credit card debt of £3000 at an Annual Percentage Rate of 12% (or 1% per month). He makes payments of £30 per month and does not gain
any charges or additional spending on the card. How long will it take him to pay off this debt?’’
(n) (%)
Less than 5 years 47 3.8
Between 5 and 10 years 196 15.9
More than 10 years 232 18.8
None of the above, he will continue to be in debt 534 43.3
Do not know 225 18.2





594 J. Gathergood / Journal of Economic Psychology 33 (2012) 590–602A. ‘Which of the following statements best describes how well you [and your partner] are keeping up with your credit commit-
ments at the moment?’
1. I am/we are keeping up with all bills and commitments without any difﬁculties
2. I am/we are keeping up with all bills and commitments, but it is a struggle from time to time
3. I am/we are keeping all bills and commitments, but it is a constant struggle
4. I am/we are falling behind with some bills or credit commitments
5. I am/we are having real ﬁnancial problems and have fallen behind with many bills or credit commitments
6. I/we don’t have any bills or credit commitments
7. Don’t know
From the responses to this question we identify self-reported over-indebted households as those for which the respon-
dent choose Statement 5. In our analysis sample 8.5% of households (102 observations) chose statement 5. Taking these mea-
sures together, fewer households report they are facing ‘real ﬁnancial problems’ as well as delinquency (8.3% of the sample)
compared with the number of households reporting 1-month or 3-month delinquency (17.5% and 10% respectively). Overall,
J. Gathergood / Journal of Economic Psychology 33 (2012) 590–602 59519% (234 households) of households in the analysis sample can be classiﬁed as over-indebted by at least one of the over-
indebtedness measures we use.10
2.3. Measures of behavioural characteristics
To measure the proportion of households with self-control problems, households who heavily discount future consump-
tion and who are ﬁnancial disorganised in the analysis sample we employ a survey instrument whereby households are
asked to identify the extent to which their behaviour corresponds that described in a short statement. Existing studies in
the economics literature provide evidence that individuals are willing and able to self-identify their sub-optimal behavioural
traits and provide meaningful responses which explain economic outcomes. Ameriks et al. (2003) use a series of statements
relating to ﬁnancial planning activity, which also include examples where individuals are asked to associate themselves with
stated behaviours which might be perceived as sub-optimal, such as failure to produce a plan. A similar approach is used in
Ameriks et al. (2007).
The statements we use refer speciﬁcally to individual behaviour with regard to ﬁnancial choices, rather than more general
behaviours.11 The statements used were as follows:
(i) ‘I am impulsive and tend to buy things even when I can’t really afford them’
(ii) ‘I am prepared to spend now and let the future take care of itself’
(iii) ‘Financial services are complicated and confusing to me’
together with the following options, from which respondents could choose one:
(a) Agree strongly (b) Tend to agree (c) Neither agree nor disagree.
(d) Tend to disagree (e) Disagree strongly (f) Don’t know.
We label these the ‘impulsiveness’ statement, the ‘heavy discounter’ statement and the ‘confused about ﬁnance’ state-
ment respectively. The proportion of households who positively identify themselves as being ‘impulsive’ by this measure
in our analysis sample conforms to the proportion of individuals who are identiﬁed as having self-control problems by other
elicitation methods in other studies. In the analysis sample 9.2% of respondents agree strongly or tend to agree with the
impulsiveness statement. In Ameriks et al. (2007) 11.2% of their sample report a present bias in their expected compared
with ideal time allocation of restaurant vouchers, though their sample is comprised of high-wealth individuals.
2.4. Measure of ﬁnancial literacy
Our measure of ﬁnancial literacy is comprised of three survey questions derived from the ﬁnancial literacy literature. In
Lusardi (2008), ‘core’ ﬁnancial literacy is comprised of the three concepts of interest compounding, real vs nominal returns
and portfolio diversiﬁcation. However, in the context of overindebtedness the latter two are not relevant, so instead we
choose to introduce ﬁnancial literacy questions which are pertinent to individuals in debt, based on those used by Lusardi
and Tufano (2009). The questions and responses among our sample are provided in Table 4.
A little fewer than 85% of respondents answered the ﬁrst question on interest compounding correctly, slightly fewer than
54% answered the interest compounding question correctly and a little more than 43% answered the monthly payments
question correctly. What is clear among respondents in our sample is that a signiﬁcant proportion of individuals with out-
standing consumer credit debts do not answer these questions about the cost of consumer credit correctly. Only a little more
than 31% of respondents answered all three questions correctly, with a little over 40% answering only one or fewer of the
questions correctly.
2.5. Characteristics of over-indebted and non-over indebted households
From Table 5, based on observed characteristics, over-indebtedness is more common among households with respon-
dents who are younger, unmarried with children, with less education, lower rates of employment and higher rates of unem-
ployment, lower rates of outright homeownership and higher rates of private and social renting (especially social renting).10 This implies there are a small group of households (1.5% of the analysis sample) who chose Statement 5 from the indebtedness question but did not identify
any credit commitment on which they were at least on month delinquent in the module on their credit commitments, which reﬂects a small degree of
inconsistency in respondent reports of credit delinquency within the survey.
11 We are conﬁdent that the behaviours described in the statements are accurate translations of the behaviours encapsulated in models of self-control and in
the concepts of time discounting and ﬁnancial sophistication. The statement on impulsive behaviour refers speciﬁcally to purchases which the individual has
some sense is unaffordable to them but are motivated by impulsiveness. The statement is neither too general (for example, referring to impulsive behaviour
across an unspeciﬁed domain) not too particular (for example, specifying a particular type or context for spending). Similarly, the ‘heavy discounter’ statement
captures the concept of a strong present time preference for consumption. It speciﬁcally refers to expenditure and refers to ideal time patterns of expenditure
which the individual would actually want to implement ‘am prepared’. The third statement, the most straightforward of the three, captures general confusion
on the part of the respondent with regard to ﬁnancial services.
Table 5
Demographic, ﬁnancial, literacy and behavioural characteristics of over-indebted vs non-over-indebted.
Unit Over-indebted Non-over-indebted
Age
18–25 % 6.8 9.4
26–35 % 23.9 27.6
36–45 % 26.4 20.0
46–55 % 21.4 18.9
Over 55 % 21.4 24.1
Male % 41.9 46.7
Married % 56.8 71.6
Education leaving age years 18.1 18.8
Employment status
Employed or self-employed % 59.4 67.5
Unemployed % 8.5 3.3
Retired % 5.6 11.1
Spouse employed % 34.6 53.3
Has dependent children % 33.7 24.0
Homeownership status
Homeowner without mortgage % 8.1 15.3
Homeowner with mortgage % 34.2 46.8
Private renter % 25.6 20.5
Social renter % 20.9 8.7
Household ﬁnances
Income £ 29,700 40,000
Unsecured debt £ 10,500 6600
Behavioural characteristics
Financially literate % 48.2 63.6
Confused by ﬁnance % 48.7 38.0
Heavy discounter % 17.5 12.5
Impulsive spender % 17.5 7.3
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debts equivalent to one third of their annual income (compared with one-sixth for non-over-indebted households).
In terms of the behavioural characteristics of households in our sample, we compare these by creating a series of 1/0
indicator dummy variables for whether the household is ﬁnancial literate, confused by ﬁnance, a heavy discounter or an
impulsive spender.12 By these measures, over-indebted households in our sample are one third less likely to be ﬁnancially
literate, one quarter more likely to be confused by ﬁnancial, half more likely to be a heavy discounter and more than twice as
likely to be impulsive spenders compared with non-over indebted households. These summary statistics demonstrate that
over-indebted households contrast with non-over-indebted households by a range of demographic, ﬁnancial and behavioural
characteristics.
3. Econometric model and estimation
Next we seek to model the relationship between these demographic, ﬁnancial and behavioural characteristics and over-
indebtedness. The econometric model to be estimated is:12 The
questio
value ood ¼ a0 þ a1flþ a2cf þ a3hdþ a4isþ a05zþ e ð1Þ
where od is a 1/0 dummy indicator of over-indebtedness; ﬂ, cf, hd and is are the 1/0 dummy indicator variables for ﬁnancially
literate, confused by ﬁnance, heavy discounter and impulsive spender respectively, z is a vector of controls including demo-
graphic, ﬁnancial and economic variables and e is an error term. We estimate Eq. (1) using a Probit model.
Table 6 presents results. In Column 1 the indicator variables for ﬁnancially literate and impulsive spender have a positive
signs and are statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level. The baseline predicted probability for the dependent variable is 0.14. The
marginal effects of imply that an impulsive spender is approximately 70% more likely to be 1 month delinquent and a ﬁnan-
cially literate consumer is 40% less likely to be 1 month delinquent. Columns 2 and 3 present estimates for the two other
indicators of over-indebtedness. In both cases the coefﬁcient on the impulsive spender variable remains statistically signif-
icant at the 1% level with a marginal effect implying a similar magnitude to that found in Column 1. However, in these spec-
iﬁcations the coefﬁcient on the ﬁnancial literacy measure is not statistically signiﬁcant. These results imply variation inse are constructed as follows: the ﬁnancially literate dummy takes a value of 1 is the respondent answered at least two of the ﬁnancial literacy
ns correctly and a value of 0 otherwise; the other three dummies take a value of 1 is the respondent answered ‘agree strongly’ or ‘tend to agree’ and a
f 0 otherwise.
Table 6
Baseline models for over-indebtedness.
(1) (2) (3)
One month behind Three month behind Self-reported
Financially literate 0.21 0.18 0.10
(0.09) (0.11) (0.12)
[0.05] 0.02 [0.01]
Confused by ﬁnance 0.13 0.01 0.10
(0.09) (0.11) (0.12)
[0.03] [0.01] [0.01]
Heavy discounter 0.04 0.05 0.19
(0.13) (0.16) (0.18)
[0.01] [0.01] [0.01]
Impulsive spender 0.37 0.44 0.65
(0.14) (0.16) (0.17)
[0.10] [0.07] [0.04]
Age 18–25 0.59 0.70 0.54
(0.19) (0.24) (0.26)
[0.10] [0.06] [0.01]
Age 26–35 0.18 0.26 0.42
(0.13) (0.15) (0.18)
[0.04] [0.03] [0.01]
Age 46–55 0.02 0.04 0.25
(0.14) (0.16) (0.17)
[0.01] [0.01] [0.01]
Age over 55 0.01 0.02 0.42
(0.16) (0.19) (0.19)
[0.01] [0.01] [0.02]
Unemployed 0.57 0.41 0.44
(0.19) (0.22) (0.23)
[0.17] [0.07] [0.03]
Spouse employed 0.41 0.52 0.15
(0.13) (0.15) (0.18)
[0.09] [0.07] [0.01]
Has dependent children 0.48 0.45 0.25
(0.11) (0.13) (0.15)
[0.12] [0.07] [0.01]
N 1234 1234 1234
R2 0.12 0.15 0.18
LR 139.06 118.65 126.26
Prob>chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Baseline pred. prob. 0.14 0.06 0.10
Notes: Signiﬁcant at 5% level, signiﬁcant at 1% level. Variables also included in models: gender, marital status (married, widowed, co-habiting, divorce
(baseline group: single)), education leaving age, homeownership status (outright owner, mortgaged owner, private renter (baseline group: social renter),
value of household income (plus income squared), value of household liquid assets (plus assets squared).
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ﬁnancial literacy.
Why do we ﬁnd this relationship between literacy, impulsiveness and over-indebtedness? In particular, why do we ﬁnd
the strong relationship between impulsiveness and problem debt? One possibility is that individuals who act impulsively in
their spending decisions use forms of consumer credit which make themmore vulnerable to incurring debt problems. As we
suggested in the introduction, different forms of consumer credit present greater or lesser opportunities to facilitate im-
pulse-driven purchases.
The equation to be estimated is nowp ¼ a0 þ a1flþ a2cf þ a3hdþ a4isþ a05zþ e ð2Þ
where p is a 1/0 dummy indicator value for whether the individual holds a positive balance on at least one consumer credit
product of a particular type. In our data the product types which enter as ‘p’ in our estimates are: credit card, overdraft, per-
sonal loan, store card, car loan, mail order catalogue, hire purchase, home credit, pay day loan, credit union loan. Eq. (2) is
estimated in each case using a Probit model. Results are presented in Table 7.
Results show the impulsive spender dummy is statistically signiﬁcant with a positive coefﬁcient in models for those types
of credit products which most embody the characteristics of facilitating rash spending: store cards, mail order catalogues,
Table 7
Behavioural characteristics and credit product usage.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Credit card Overdraft Personal loan Store card Car loan
Financially literate 0.04 0.15 0.17 0.04 0.01
(0.09) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10)
[0.01] [0.06] [0.05] [0.01] [0.01]
Confused by ﬁnance 0.08 0.09 0.04 0.03 0.15
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09)
[0.03] [0.03] [0.01] [0.01] [0.03]
Heavy discounter 0.24 0.10 0.04 0.06 0.01
(0.13) (0.11) (0.13) (0.13) (0.14)
[0.07] [0.04] [0.01] [0.02] [0.01]
Impulsive spender 0.15 0.11 0.23 0.35 0.22
(0.15) (0.14) (0.15) (0.15) (0.16)
[0.05] [0.04] [0.07] [0.10] [0.06]
Demographic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Financial controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 1234 1234 1234 1234 1234
R2 0.08 0.03 0.08 0.06 0.07
LR 117.53 44.84 107.69 71.35 81.34
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0028 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Baseline probability 0.75 0.57 0.23 0.17 0.15
(6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Mail order catalogue Hire purchase Home credit Pay day loan Credit union loan
Financially literate 0.32 0.03 0.12 0.07 1.25
(0.09) (0.12) (0.25) (0.25) (0.35)
[0.08] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01]
Confused by ﬁnance 0.24 0.07 0.77 0.02 0.38
(0.09) (0.12) (0.29) (0.23) (0.25)
[0.05] [0.01] [0.03] [0.01] [0.01]
Heavy discounter 0.13 0.09 0.11 0.18 0.30
(0.14) (0.17) (0.39) (0.29) (0.44)
[0.03] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01]
Impulsive spender 0.50 0.21 0.66 0.65 0.29
(0.15) (0.18) (0.32) (0.29) (0.40)
[0.14] [0.03] [0.04] [0.01] [0.01]
Demographic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Financial controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 1234 1234 1234 1234 1234
R2 0.14 0.06 0.23 0.28 0.26
LR 156.65 36.13 39.56 53.01 47.16
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0294 0.0057 0.0001 0.0006
Baseline pred. prob. 0.14 0.06 0.01 0.005 0.008
Notes: Signiﬁcant at 5% level, signiﬁcant at 1% level. Variables also included in models: gender, marital status (married, widowed, co-habiting, divorce
(baseline group: single)), education leaving age, homeownership status (outright owner, mortgaged owner, private renter (baseline group: social renter),
value of household income (plus income squared), value of household liquid assets (plus assets squared).
598 J. Gathergood / Journal of Economic Psychology 33 (2012) 590–602home credit and pay day loans. These product types have in common the features of being readily available at the point of
purchase of a good which is advertised in conjunction with the availability of the credit facility, so allowing consumers
drawn to impulsive spending to access near-instant credit to facilitate that spending.13 They are also higher-cost products.
The marginal effects of the coefﬁcients in each case imply that individuals who are impulsive spenders are, in all cases, at least
twice as likely to use such products. Results also suggest that more literate individuals are less likely to use mail order cata-
logues or credit union loans.
These results suggest the relationship between impulse spending and over-indebtedness is at least in part mediated
through the types of consumer credit used by impulsive spenders and the contexts for their credit use which particular13 To be speciﬁc: store cards facilitate impulse spending by being advertised and available at store checkouts, with applications approved while the customer
queues for purchase and credit available within a few minutes; mail order catalogues are designed for consumers to order purchases from the catalogue on
ﬁnance; home credit (or doorstep credit) providers offer cash transfers to individuals on their doorstep and make loan decisions in a short space of time at the
doorstep; pay day lenders (high-street lenders) clear cash transfers in minutes and make funds available to the shopper on the high street. Maybe it is therefore
unsurprising that impulsive spenders are shown to be more likely to use such forms of credit.
Table 8
Financial shocks among over-indebted vs non-over-indebted.
Unit Over-indebted Non-over-indebted
Recent shocks
Job loss % 24.3 6.4
Income fall % 38.9 17.5
Credit withdrawn % 17.5 3.8
Major expense % 47.9 37.9
Table 9
ﬁnancial shocks, behavioural characteristics and over-indebtedness.
(1) (2) (3)
One month delinquency Three month delinquency Self-reported over-indebtedness
Financially literate 0.19 0.14 0.08
(0.09) (0.12) (0.13)
[0.04] [0.02] [0.01]
Confused by ﬁnance 0.07 0.05 0.01
(0.10) (0.11) (0.12)
[0.02] [0.01] [0.01]
Heavy discounter 0.07 0.02 0.16
(0.14) (0.17) (0.18)
[0.20] [0.01] [0.01]




Job loss 0.53 0.41 0.28
(0.15) (0.16) (0.18)
[0.14] [0.06] [0.01]
Income fall 0.41 0.29 0.62
(0.11) (0.13) (0.14)
[0.10] [0.04] [0.02]
Credit withdrawn 0.89 0.70 0.63
(0.17) (0.18) (0.19)
[0.27] [0.12] [0.03]
Major expense 0.27 0.25 0.12
(0.09) (0.13) (0.13)
[0.06] [0.03] [0.01]
Demographic controls Yes Yes Yes
Financial controls Yes Yes Yes
N 1234 1234 1234
R2 0.20 0.20 0.25
LR 227.63 162.47 172.53
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Baseline pred. prob. 0.13 0.06 0.10
Variables also included in models: gender, marital status (married, widowed, co-habiting, divorce (baseline group: single)), education leaving age,
homeownership status (outright owner, mortgaged owner, private renter (baseline group: social renter), value of household income (plus income squared),
value of household liquid assets (plus assets squared).
J. Gathergood / Journal of Economic Psychology 33 (2012) 590–602 599product types allow. Of course, not all consumers who use these particular product types exhibit over-indebtedness, but our
results show that impulsive behaviour which is associated with over-indebtedness is also associated with greater use of
these forms of credit.
A second possible explanation for the relationship between impulsive spending behaviour and over-indebtedness is that
households who are impulsive in their spending might also be impulsive in other dimensions of their behaviour (such as in
the labour market or goods market) such that they are more exposed to income shocks or unforeseen expenditures.14 To14 Della Vigna and Paserman (2005) show that individuals who are more impatient engage in lower quality job search in the labour market compared with
more patient individuals, suggesting individuals with impulsive tendencies might engage in suboptimal behaviour in a wider range of domains than just
consumption choice (Della Vigna, 2009; Della Vigna & Malmenider, 2004). Such outcomes might arise due to, for example, lower quality job matches resulting
in greater likelihood of redundancy or income falls. Similarly, impulsiveness might lead to lower quality product search in goods markets and lead to agents
being more exposed to expenditure shocks arising from good failing or requiring replacement. This might be particularly relevant for durable goods, which
requires patience as the utility ﬂow is realised over a period of time.
600 J. Gathergood / Journal of Economic Psychology 33 (2012) 590–602incorporate ﬁnancial shocks into our model of over-indebtedness we introduce measures of four categories of the most relevant
forms of ﬁnancial shocks: job loss, income fall, credit withdrawal and a major expense. These measures are derived from a series
of questions included in the survey on the recent experience of respondents in these areas.15 Table 8 compares the prevalence of
ﬁnancial shocks among over-indebted and non-over-indebted households. The data show over-indebted households were more
likely to have experienced each type of shock, being (approximately) four times as likely to have experienced job loss, twice as
likely to have experienced a fall in income, four times as likely to have experienced credit withdrawal and one quarter more
likely to have experienced a major expense.









loans (aod ¼ a0 þ a1flþ a2cf þ a3hdþ a4isþ a5jlþ a6if þ a7cwþ a8meþ a09zþ e ð3Þ
where the variables jl, if, cw and me are a series of 1/0 dummy variables which take the value of 1 is the household reports
experiencing that ﬁnancial shock in the previous 6 months and a value of 0 otherwise. Results are presented in Table 9. In all
of the speciﬁcations the income fall and credit withdrawn variables are positive and signiﬁcant at the 5% level of lower. The
marginal effects on these coefﬁcients imply large effects of ﬁnancial shocks on the likelihood of over-indebtedness. The coef-
ﬁcient on the impulsive spender dummy becomes statistically insigniﬁcant in Columns 1 and 2, though remains statistically
signiﬁcant at the 1% level in Column 3. Hence the relationship between impulsive spending behaviour and over-indebted-
ness appears in part explained by the tendency for individuals who identify themselves as impulsive spenders to also more
commonly report experiencing a ﬁnancial shock compared with individuals who do not report they are impulsive spenders.
4. Conclusion
This study has examined the relationship between self-control, ﬁnancial literacy and over-indebtedness using survey data
from a representative sample of UK households with consumer credit debts. In our sample a subset of households exhibited a
tendency towards impulsive spending and heavily discounting future consumption. Levels of ﬁnancial literacy were found to
be low in absolute terms and two-ﬁfths of our sample reported being confused by ﬁnance. We ﬁnd that poor ﬁnancial lit-
eracy and self-control problems are both positively associated with over-indebtedness. There is stronger evidence for a role
for self-control problems, our measure of self-control is more signiﬁcant in statistical terms and implies stronger economic
effects in all speciﬁcations. Our extensions also shed light on why consumers with self-control problems are more likely to
become over-indebted: such consumers make more use of high-cost credit (in particular forms of high-cost credit accessible
at short notice and/or at the point of sale) and tend to also be more exposed to ﬁnancial shocks.
These results are important for three reasons. Firstly, they show that consumer behavioural traits are important for
explaining consumer over-indebtedness. The literatures on ﬁnancial literacy and self-control have sought to ﬁnd examples
of how these tenets of consumer behaviour can be found to explain economic outcomes. We have shown that the empirical
relevance of this literature, which has focused on the accrual of wealth and retirement saving, also extends to the issue of
consumer over-indebtedness.
Secondly, our results for the relationship between self-control and over-indebtedness suggest that consumers might ben-
eﬁt from less access to credit. One might argue that poor ﬁnancial literacy and poor self-control imply different remedies:
whereas ﬁnancial literacy might be improved through ﬁnancial education, individuals cannot be educated on self-control.
This raises the prospect that individual choices need to be restricted so as to prevent individuals from engaging in sub-opti-
mal behaviour.16 In the context of the consumer credit market, there may be an argument for restricting credit available at the
point-of-sale or delaying access to funds so as to mitigate consumer self-control problems.
Finally, our results on the relationship between self-control and ﬁnancial shocks suggest that individuals with self-control
problems have higher exposure to adverse events, possibly due to their impulsive behaviour resulting to sub-optimal out-
comes in other dimensions of individual choice apart from intertemporal consumption/saving decisions. Relatively little re-
search exists of impulsive outside of the context of intertemporal consumption choice. However, one might think that self-
control problems are relevant in a broad range of choice settings relating to consumption insurance, the composition of con-
sumption (purchase of durables and repairs), search in product markets, and activity in labour markets. Our ﬁndings suggest
the interplay between different dimensions of individual self-control behaviour might be important for explaining economic
outcomes.he case of job loss, respondents are asked whether they have recently experienced redundancy (with or without a severance payment), their partner
experienced redundancy (with or without a severance payment), or ended work due to illness. In the case of income fall respondents are asked
r they have recent experienced a ‘signiﬁcant fall’ in their income, or their partner’s income. For credit withdrawal respondents are asked whether they
cently had their credit card withdrawn, credit limit reduced on their credit card or an overdraft facility withdrawn. For major expenses, respondents are
hether they have recently incurred house repairs, replacement of a major household item due to failure or car repairs. For each case the ‘recent’ period
onsideration is set at the previous 6 months. Respondents are asked to provide a yes/no response to each question.
on-going Department for Business Innovation and Skills consultation into reforming the consumer credit regime in the UK raises the prospect of
opportunities for individuals to gain instant access to credit. The consultation proposes, for example, prohibiting stores from offering instant access
rd credit, instead insisting upon individuals waiting at least 5 days before the card is issued. There are also proposals to limit the number of Pay Day
nd rollover loans) any one individual can use each year.
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